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Clark Butler 
Hermeneutic Hegelianism 
1. Ontological Historical Materialism. The Hegel-Marx relationship remains an issue both for 
Hegel scholars aware of underlying world historical causes of the recent Hegel Renaissance and 
Marx scholars attentive to the philosophical roots of Marxism. It may be questioned, however, 
whether the relation is merely historical and circumstantial or necessary and internal as well. 
Marx claimed to have overturned the Hegelian system.1 Yet the classical formula, according to 
which Marxism shares with Hegelianism its method but not its system, that the Hegelian system 
contradicts the dialectical methodology it shares with Marxism2 has exercised wide influence. On 
numerous issues, e.g., the state, the universal class, the alienation of labor, Hegelian and Marxist 
doctrines are admittedly not only different but contradictory. To this extent Engels’s classical 
formula is correct. But surely the more important consideration is method, though doctrine has so 
overshadowed methodological considerations in both Marxism and Hegelianism that it has been 
rare to define either school except in terms of specific tenets. Doctrinal definition of any 
movement resembles a death warrant. If either Marxism or Hegelianism is scientific and thus 
capable of breaking loose from nineteenth-century chains, it must be defined methodologically, 
programmatically. Contrary to Engels’s formula, I shall distinguish between Marxist and 
Hegelian methods, but shall argue that the methods are not only compatible but complementary.3  
I do not suggest that Hegel’s method can be defined independently of any doctrinal beliefs. 
Proper definition of Hegel’s method requires correction of common misinterpretations of his 
system, including the Marxist misinterpretation. On one point, unrecognized by Marx, Marx and 
Hegel were in agreement: Hegel was an ontological, if not methodological, historical materialist. 
Joachim Ritter has shown that Hegel knew that the modern state was conditioned by the 
emergence of industrial civil society which it sought to regulate.4 More generally, Hegel 
recognized that geography and natural history condition all rational dialectical progress in 
institutional and cultural history.5 The entire Hegelian system has as its material basis the greatest 
of all ecological and economic mutations: the patriarchal herding agricultural revolution, 
bringing the decline of primitive animism and the Fichtean-Cartesian alienation of humanity 
from nature as the basis of common sense. The system is the self-criticism and self-
transcendence of that alienation in favor of reconciliation with nature.6 The pastoral agrarian 
revolution, the labor of capital accumulation after the ice age, established the self-abstraction and 
self-absolutization of the thinking self—the standpoint of pure thought in the Logic—in a 
position of lordship over against a nature accordingly emptied of divinity. It was thus a causal 
condition of the problem of the analytic understanding which Hegelian reason claims to solve.  
But if Hegel is an ontological historical materialist in this sense, “nature” for Hegel cannot, as in 
Engels’s Hegel interpretation,7 simply mean the self-alienation, or other, of the idea. If nature 
conditions thought, it has ontological status distinct from thought. Matter cannot causally 
condition the form it assumes if it is merely the self-externalization of that form. “Nature” is in 
fact ambiguous for Hegel. The nature whose dialectic is constructed in his philosophy of nature 
is indeed the self-alienation of the idea. Metaphorically, this nature is “created” by the thinking 
subject. The subject’s abstraction and absolutization of itself apart from the primordial nature of 
the primitive animist, in which it was previously immersed, call forth an alien world of objects, 
of obstacles devoid of subjectivity. The emergence of created nature thus presupposes a more 
primitive nature as a causal condition of the self-absolutization of pure disembodied thought. 
Before the fall into the inescapable alienation of labor, there was an undifferentiated animal-like 
oneness with the soul life of nature. Primitive gatherers and hunters live before creation, before 
the despiritualization of the world into the other of thought. But any eternal nature preceding the 
self-opposition of the thinking subject to a fallen nature is not encompassed by the system. It 
rather encompasses the system as the basis on which thought abstracts itself to construct the 
system of categories, and as the home to which it returns.8  
2. The Three Hegels: Panlogist, Platonist, and Hermeneutic. That nature primordially 
overreaches the system precludes common panlogist, essentialist, or exaggerated Platonic realist 
construals of the system. Exaggerated Platonic realism predates Hegel, and “essentialism” was 
not used by Gilson to refer specifically to Hegel,9 but “panlogism” was coined by Johann Eduard 
Erdmann specifically to designate Hegelianism as a philosophy that “admits nothing as actual 
except reason, attributing to what is not rational a purely fleeting, self-cancelling existence.”10 By 
“reason” he means the dialectical system of categories, including those of the philosophy of 
nature and spirit as well as those of “logic” in the narrower sense.11 The Absolute is equated with 
a categoreal system. An existing particular is but a passing moment in the life of reason, and is 
self-contradictory if assigned actual reality on its own. Understanding Hegel in this way, 
Erdmann upheld Hegelianism. But the panlogist Hegel interpretation is far more commonly used 
to reject Hegelianism. In either case, the term designates a Hegelian version of essentialism —
and a Hegelian heir to exaggerated Platonic realism.  
The panlogist interpretation, shared by Marx along with other Hegel critics, construes the system 
to be the original and objective self-construction of the divine mind. But, however widespread, 
this is not the only Hegel interpretation. It seems to me that three general types of Hegel 
interpretation are possible: (1) panlogist Hegelianism, which recognizes only pure thought and 
thought objects and dissolves particulars into such objects; (2) Platonized Hegelianism, which 
recognizes the empirical world as well, but only as an accidental fall away from pure thought and 
center of striving for reunion with it; (3) hermeneutic Hegelianism, which sees in the empirical 
world the nonaccidental or necessary expression of thought. The Platonic interpretation, recently 
presupposed by Hegel critic Michael Rosen,12 argues in a theistic vein that Hegel’s system is an 
imperfect simulation of a complete and eternal vision enjoyed by a transcendent divine mind. 
Hermeneutic Hegelianism agrees with the panlogist interpretation that the system is the objective 
and original self-construction of the divine spirit, but it recognizes a second, formal, subjective, 
and methodological sense of “system” in which it is reconstructive. The divine spirit and its 
systematic self-construction, not restricted as in panlogism to a realm of pure thought, exists 
objectively in and through empirical history. Though not denying ontological status to the 
material basis of dialectical thought, its methodological goal is not to weigh the impact of 
material conditions on the life of thought but rather to interpret thought through its resultant, 
materially given expressions. Formal Hegelian philosophy thus becomes a reconstruction not 
only of divine self-construction but, by virtue of the logical tie between inner thought and its 
outer expression, of the inner meaning of empirical history as well. Yet because empirical history 
expresses not only pure thought but also natural causes which can interfere with thought, it is 
marked with “contingency”; its reconstruction is ideal, not always factual.  
Panlogist Hegelianism attributes process to God, though it is a purely conceptual process. 
Platonized or theistic Hegelianism attributes process to the human systematic simulation of the 
divine, but not to that mind itself, so that the simulation as a constructive process remains 
external to what it constructs. Since the divine mind is not self-constructive, systematic 
philosophy is not reconstructive. Hermeneutic Hegelianism attributes process both to the 
objective spirit in history and to the empathetic reconstruction of divine self-construction. On 
this view, philosophy becomes a humanistic discipline devoted to the interpretation of 
empirically given relics, monuments, documents, art, texts, and other works—recreating and 
internally criticizing the original thought of the creator. Because every interpreted expression is 
an empirical phenomenon, the thought of its creator must be empirically expressed. Unexpressed 
thought is uninterpretable. If the Absolute is panlogistically construed merely as pure thought, it 
cannot be reconstructed because it cannot be expressed or communicated. If the Absolute is 
understood in Platonic theistic fashion as an immutable divine vision, it cannot be reconstructed 
because it is devoid of creative process. But recreation, reliving, reenactment—in the specific 
form of rethinking—is the essence of the Hegelian method. Humans are thinking beings, and to 
reenact human life is to rethink it. Hegel himself, I take it, is an hermeneutic Hegelian. Though 
for himself he disowned the Romantic ideal of creative genius, as a member of the Romantic 
tradition of German hermeneutics he cultivated scholarly interpretation and criticism of such 
genius. Hegel’s hermeneutic method was merely used by Hegel himself; we must reflect on it, so 
that a programmatic Hegelianism controlling and even correcting Hegel’s results becomes 
possible.  
3. Refutation of Hegelian Panlogism. Though Platonizing interpretations of Hegel have been 
advocated by right Hegelian scholars sympathetic to Hegel, such as J. N. Findlay and Quentin 
Lauer,13 and have called forth Hegel critiques by such writers as Michael Rosen, the panlogist 
interpretation is most responsible for the anti-Hegelianism of the past century. Tillich wrote that 
the essentialist trend of modern philosophy culminated in Hegel’s attempt to interpret all reality 
in terms of “a system of essences.”14 Feuerbach, Marx, Kierkegaard, Dewey, Russell, and Moore 
all began as Hegelians, but all “went beyond” Hegel and helped found major non-Hegelian 
movements after concluding that Hegel illegitimately reduced all reality to an “unearthly ballet 
of bloodless categories” (Bradley).15 James assumed the panlogist reading in his denunciation of 
the block universe,16 while Russell assumed that Hegel reduced the rich hues of reality to 
something “thin and logical.”17 The panlogist reading of Hegel continues in scholars such as 
Hypollite, Bernstein, Wartofsky, and Manfred Frank.18 But it is quite impossible to go beyond 
any philosopher if one never really enters his position. Refutation of the panlogist interpretation 
of Hegel is essential for the sake of a cooperative, intersubjectively corrigible, empirically 
informed Hegelian interpretation capable of leading beyond Hegel’s own results. Panlogism 
prescribes a nonsocial method of transcendental self-construction which makes it hard to see 
how we can come to understand and repeat Hegel’s thought and impossible to see how we can 
understand dialectically the data of history and nature by our own independent inquiry, 
confirming or disconfirming Hegel. If the empirical data are resolved into universal thought 
objects constructed by the thinker, there is no alien subjectivity expressing itself in empirical 
expressions to be discovered and interpreted.  
The panlogist view seems to be supported by some Hegelian texts. I will not discuss the assertion 
of the rationality of the actual in the Philosophy of Right, since Knox has clearly pointed out how 
the panlogist interpretation of the assertion confuses the “actual” and the “existent.”19 But I will 
say something about the first chapter of the Phenomenology on particulars allegedly dissolving 
into universals, and the fifth chapter on reason certain of itself in all reality. The first chapter 
really justifies, I think, the view that Hegel is a conceptualistic nominalist, not an essentialist, 
while the fifth chapter justifies ascribing to Hegel an Aristotelian understanding of “reason” as 
an essential property.  
Hegel’s lectures on ancient philosophy given while composing the Phenomenology attribute the 
critique of sense certainty in chapter one with the Megarian Stilpo. On the panlogist 
interpretation we would expect Hegel to agree with Stilpo, but in fact he disagrees.20 He, of 
course, rejects “crude” nominalism as well, but he approves the “non-crude” nominalism or 
conceptualism of Locke.21 The conceptualist distinction between thought and things is stated in 
the Encyclopaedia: “in thinking things we transform them into something universal; but things 
are singular.”22 The critique of sense certainty establishes essentialism only if we forget that the 
Phenomenology records the experience, not of all spirit, but of thinking consciousness. Certain 
forms of spirit—preconscious feeling or sentience treated in the Encyclopaedia—precede the 
abstraction of thought. But sense certainty, though the lowest form of thinking consciousness, is 
still a form of thought and not of mere sensation. It is the thinking abstraction and absolutization 
of the sensory particular. It is thus hardly surprising that sense certainty turns out to encounter 
nothing but universals or thought objects. Thought produces universals out of the singular 
entities encountered by preabstractive mentality.  
Chapter five seems to suggest in a panlogist vein that the Phenomenology moves toward 
confirmation of reason’s certitude of being one with all reality. Since for Hegel, the “real” 
includes more than the “actual,” reason’s identity with the real seems to support panlogism more 
strongly than the more often quoted preface to the Philosophy of Right. But the rationality of the 
real is properly understood in a nonpanlogist Aristotelian sense. Reason is the eternal essence of 
the Absolute because it is its highest potential, not because no nonrational empirical reality has 
ever existed: 
In what he (Aristotle) teaches respecting the soul we shall find him recurring to this speculative 
thought (that thought is the absolute Idea only through activity, not as unmoved); but to him it is 
again an object, like other objects, a kind of condition which he understands empirically, such as 
sleep, or weariness. He does not say that it alone is truth, that all is summed up in Thought, but 
he does say it is the first, the strongest, the most honorable. We, on the other hand, say that 
Thought, as that which relates to itself, has existence, or is the truth; that thought comprehends 
the whole truth, even though we ordinarily represent to ourselves sensation and so on, besides 
thought, as having reality. Thus although Aristotle does not express himself in modern 
philosophic language, he has yet throughout the same fundamental theory.23  
That the real is rational means that reason is the highest potential and manifestation of the real—
presupposing and including all lower potentials. Rationality is the eternal essence of the Absolute 
because the Absolute’s rational self-comprehension is its highest manifestation, not because 
there never was a state of the Absolute in which such comprehension was absent. Hegel’s 
difference with Aristotle is that, since he views all reality as a self-actualizing substance, he does 
not hold that actualization must be passively received by a first substance from a second 
substance already in act. He is a process philosopher for whom process generates novelty—
though a novelty which first reveals what was always essential to the substance. In the end there 
is no substance viewed as an inert material substratum, but only spirit, an infinite self-movement 
of subjective acts.  
Even when the Absolute achieves systematic self-comprehension, it is never the whole in the 
sense of exhausting its empirical richness, whether ontologically or even descriptively. An 
infinite series of dialectical cycles, each defining the Absolute more concretely, would have to be 
completed before thought could surrender its congenital abstraction and grasp the Absolute 
exhaustively. This is a Hegelian version of the necessary incompleteness of description. Yet just 
as the principle of a mathematical series can be understood without completing the series, so an 
infinite dialectical series could be grasped by grasping the rules for generating new dialectical 
moves from previous ones, without going through all the moves. But the purpose of the dialectic 
is real definition of the Absolute, not complete description. Thought does reach the conclusion of 
the dialectic. It reaches a fully concrete definition of the Absolute, not a fully concrete Absolute, 
nor a complete description of the Absolute. In form thought grasps the whole, but not in all its 
content. The system is not the Absolute. From the standpoint of hermeneutic Hegelianism, 
empirical content is the interpretable outer expression of inner thought and cannot be dissolved 
into thought without generating a solipsistic concept of understanding without interpretation, 
meaning without a text.  
Hegel’s own criticism of Neoplatonism24 is sufficient to cast doubt on Platonizing interpretations 
of his work. But he himself—perhaps more by tone than assertion—contributed to the panlogist 
misreading of his work. Such a tendency was noted within his lifetime by several students and 
critics other than Schelling. Hegel replied in a crucial but still untranslated 1829 review of 
Göschel, conceding that his work erred through insufficient attention to the claims of 
imagination, love, and heart.25 He explained the panlogist one-sidedness of his work on 
pedagogical/polemical grounds. Hegelianism was not the dominant philosophy of Hegel’s era. 
Jacobi’s Romantic philosophy of feeling, which denied that the Absolute could be grasped 
conceptually, was most influential. Hegel, protesting perhaps too forcefully that the Absolute 
could be so grasped, gave the impression of reducing the Absolute to the system. The paradox, 
we shall see, is that Hegel did not practice his own hermeneutic method of empathetic internal 
criticism in treating the rival philosophies of his time. He practiced a nondialectical method of 
external, polemical criticism. And his philosophizing thus acquired—especially with respect to 
neo-Jacobians such as Fries and Schleiermacher—a personal edge inconsistent with his own 
deeper methodological impulse.  
4. Hegel’s Nominalism and the Hermeneutic Tradition. Once the nominalist interpretation of the 
Phenomenology’s first chapter is taken seriously, Herder appears as a more natural source of 
Hegel’s nominalism than Locke. In Herder nominalism is closely linked to the secular 
hermeneutic tradition which he helped found in Germany. Hegel started out under the influence 
of the pragmatic-Enlightenment concept of historiography,26 but in the 1790’s he fell subject to 
Herder’s Romantic critique of pragmatic historiography.27 According to Herder’s concept of the 
empathetic method, interpretation requires suspension of the interpreter’s historically and 
personally conditioned perspective: “…the computations of history are so perplexed…that it 
requires a mind wholly free from hypothesis to trace the clue. This clue is most easily lost by 
one, with whom a particular race of the people is a favorite…. The historian…must see with eyes 
as impartial as those of the creator…and judge altogether uninfluenced by the passions.”28 
Yielding to the thing itself, abstracting from certainty of self,29 the interpreter clears his mind as a 
stage on which to reenact the unfolding of the foreign standpoint according to its own immanant 
nature. The interpreter is an actor, impersonating an alien role on the emptied stage of his own 
mind. Though interpretation begins with detachment, with an act of hermeneutic self-alienation, 
the understanding it achieves is objective but not detached, not theoretical observation. For 
understanding is an empathetic reliving which engages the interpreter’s feeling—what Herder 
calls a “wandering” or “roaming about” among the countless peoples of the past. Each subject of 
interpretation is unique. “No two leaves on any one tree in nature are to be found perfectly alike; 
and still less do two human faces…resemble each other.”30 Herder understands this uniqueness 
nominalistically through the Romantic concept of individuality: each subject has a unique 
quality, and is not merely a unique co-instantiation of universal qualities. Pragmatic historians 
ignore the individuality in favor of abstract essential types, and thus can find in history 
something like the universal causal laws of natural science—laws promising explanation of the 
present and even prediction on the basis of induction and historical parallels.  
Hegel’s nominalism in the tradition of Herder implies a rejection of mechanistic determinism. To 
treat an individual “mechanically” is to treat it abstractly, to ignore its individuality.31 
Determinism assumes that events can be subsumed under causal laws correlating abstractly 
defined antecedent conditions with abstractly defined consequent conditions. But if every event 
displays a nonuniversal, totally concrete quality not open to multiple instantiation, no event can 
be caused deterministically because none is really subsumable under any abstract universal 
concept defining an effect in any causal law. When the quale of every unique event is beyond 
complete description, and when causal laws correlate describable and repeatable causal and 
resultant conditions, causal determination is limited merely to general features of the effect. The 
Hegelian model of science is thus not classical deterministic natural science even within his 
treatment of nature. Spirit—unique, individual, and productive of historical novelty—is the truth 
of nature, which is cyclical, repetitive, and subject to causal law.32 Mechanistic determinism is a 
disguise concealing the indeterministic spiritual character of nature. And spirit can be grasped 
only on a hermeneutic model of scientific understanding.  
5. The Dialectical-Hermeneutic Method. The hermeneutic method as Hegel used it differs in 
significant respects from the method of Herder. Hegel was not a Romantic vainly seeking to 
bring back to life the irrevocably lost individuality of the past. Despite Hegel’s widely admired 
power to empathize with a great range of perspectives, a frustrating experience some readers 
have had is trying to guess the individual literary text or historical subject from which he has 
abstracted a given standpoint in his system. Such frustration is based on a misunderstanding, 
since his systematic works do not attempt ordinary literary criticism or history. Rather, he uses a 
series of concrete historical or literary standpoints to abstract a series of ideal typical standpoints. 
Thus lordship for Hegel is limited to neither feudal lordship, or imperial lordship, nor divine 
lordship. Ideal typical standpoints are selected according to their contribution to the self-
constitution of the present. The ideal typical standpoint, not the past literary or historical 
individual, is preserved in the present as a transcended moment in the present standpoint’s self-
constitution. The past cannot be restored to full individuality, but it can be remembered and 
rethought in ideal typical forms. A pragmatic interest reasserts itself in Hegel’s post-Romantic, 
post-Hellenistic maturity. Hegel’s concern in his system was to interpret the past through its 
fruition in the present, to explain the present dialectically as a triumph over the contradictions of 
past standpoints. He did not explore the past for parallels to the present but for its ingredients.  
The apparent contradiction between hermeneutic self-alienation and the inescapability of the 
present—between methodological self-abandonment to the life of the historical object33 and the 
impossible leap out of one’s own century34 —is removed by seeing that the life of the past to 
which the interpreter surrenders, itself issues in the interpretive present. One abandons oneself to 
the seemingly alien life of the past only to find that this life is not really alien, that one’s own life 
is implicit in it. The interpreter’s own selfhood is constituted by an internal self-critique and self-
transcendence of past standpoints, so that hermeneutic self-alienation, pressed to the limit, 
cancels itself. The interpretive standpoint finally intervenes in interpretation by being constructed 
dialectically out of the standpoint understood through interpretation.  
6. Dialectical Necessity as Rational Deducibility. The reconstruction of the past is the self-
construction of the present. But to explain the present in light of its dialectical self-construction 
is at once to understand the past through its dialectical potential. This potential is the series of 
further standpoints rationally deducible from it. Hegel’s polemics against the deduction and the 
“geometric method”35 do not imply that the dialectic is not deductive. Any set of premises entails 
an infinity of alternative lines of deduction. Most alternatives are arbitrary and unmotivated apart 
from assurances from the argument’s author that an interesting conclusion awaits us at the end. 
Such blank check deduction, called Rasonnieren, is criticized by Hegel. The consumer of the 
argument is externally motivated by faith in the argument’s originator. Dialectical deduction is 
distinguished from this usual sort of deduction precisely through being internally motivated. 
“Refutation must not come from the outside”: “immanent deduction,” not “authority,”36 provides 
the only confirmation for a concept. The dialectical-hermeneutic method hypothesizes a single 
line of deduction, eventuating in the present standpoint, which thought—moved by internal 
reflection on a position adopted through self-abandonment to the past—would be rationally 
motivated to follow if it could develop free of external material impediments. The method 
introduces material conditions to explain cases where history fails to express rational dialectical 
necessity, but not to explain why history does express such necessity. The hypothesis of merely a 
single line of rationally necessary deduction cannot be confirmed without examining the results 
of the method’s systematic use. Short of such an examination, however, the hypothesis can be 
confirmed by a simplified model of a complete dialectical cycle. Such a model is innocuous as 
long as it is not taken as a universal schema or formalism to be imposed on all conceptual 
developments.  
The dialectic in simplified model moves from abstract to more concrete definitions of the 
Absolute. It is a thought process in which a finite aspect a of an organically related whole of 
internally related aspects is abstracted and absolutized in negation of some correlative aspect b, 
in which the absolutization of a discovers the contradiction (self-negation) of affirming a to exist 
without b, and in which the recognition of self-contradiction is overcome by dropping the 
absolutization of a to the exclusion of b (negation of the negation). The dialectical steps are: 
abstraction of a, absolutization of a, abstraction of b, negation of b to maintain the 
absolutization, self-negation of the recognition of contradiction, and negation of the negation (or 
b). The deductive necessity of the dialectic depends on construing step two as the introduction of 
a false assumption in indirect proof.37  
But deductive necessity is not yet rational deducibility (“immanent deduction”). To show 
rational deducibility, we begin again with the abstraction of a. Since nothing else has been 
abstracted, it is impossible to define a as relative to any b to which it may be internally related. 
Thus thought is rationally moved to view a as nonrelative, to absolutize a. The fear of error 
being the very first error,38 reason is exhibited in the heuristic postulation of possibly false 
assumptions. If a is internally related to b, to think a is implicitly to think b, for a exists in 
inseparable oneness with b. The explicit abstraction of a rationally motivates a transition from 
the implicit to explicit thought of b. But when the contradiction lurking behind absolutization of 
a first becomes explicit, the psychodynamics of reason justifies reabsolutization of a. To yield at 
once to counterevidence is as counterrational as refusing to yield to its accumulation. A heuristic 
assumption must become a heuristic dogma if it is to generate the pathos and pain which, for 
Hegel, are essential to reason as a dialectical learning process.39 Fixated on a, thought notes b 
only to deny its existence. Yet b is inescapable; far from vanishing, it returns to negate the 
absolutization of a, to force from thought an admission of contradiction. Only then is thought 
rationally moved to escape its self-caused negation at the hands of the negated other by 
abandoning its absolutization of a, thus allowing the more concrete a-b to enter as a new 
definition of the Absolute.  
7. Hegel’s Systematic Works as Dialectical-Hermeneutic Treatises. The Hegelian method leads 
neither to empirical history nor to an original and complete self-construction of a monistic 
Fichtean divine mind, but to an ideal reconstruction of empirical history. Yet this reconstruction 
is the philosophical completion, on the level of absolute spirit, of the historical self-construction 
of the Absolute. Hegel’s lectures on world history and the history of philosophy stay close to 
what is to be interpreted, while his systematic works present the dialectical understanding of 
historical standpoints which results from interpretation. The Encyclopaedia, expressing the 
system as a whole, is reenactment of all world history, from the patriarchal self-abstraction of 
pure logical thought, through the consequent reduction of nature to an alien other, to the reunion 
of subject and object in spirit. The philosophy of nature reconstructs the history of science from 
mechanistic physics through the rise of chemistry to biology. But insofar as nature is deficient in 
thought, the philosophy of nature constructs rather than reconstructs natural evolution.  
The Philosophy of Right illustrates the reconstructive dialectical understanding of spirit—of 
history from the Roman Empire to the present, from the Stoic transcendence of Oriental lordship 
and bondage. The first section on natural law treats the spirit of Roman law.40 The second, on 
morality, elaborates the medieval distinction between the heavenly and earthly cities, virtue and 
the way of the world.41 The third section, on the family, states the principle of the postmedieval 
state: the Prince’s claim to a territorial family domain based on private law42 opposed to papal 
pretensions. The fourth section, on civil society, thematizes the industrial revolution which 
superseded absolute monarchy, while the final section, on the state, treats the modern welfare 
state which regulates civil society. The whole work is an ideal reconstruction of Western history. 
If it succeeds, contingent history reveals a rationally necessary development.  
The Logic also gives reconstructive understanding of history—in this case the history of 
philosophy viewed as the unfolding in the realm of external contingency of the rationally 
deductive thought process of defining the Absolute.43 Hegel abandons himself to the dialectical 
life of the Parmenidean standpoint. The conceptual self-movement takes him from the ancient 
metaphysics of Being, through the modern reflective epistemological turn (“Essence”), to the 
speculative concept upheld by Hegel himself. An interpretation of pre-Socratic texts, the Logic 
draws on the entire record of philosophy’s history. Yet the contingent historical order can deviate 
from the ideal order, so that speculative thought can be anticipated by Aristotle and a reversion 
to an abstract metaphysics of being (sense impressions) can be found in Hume. Still, contrary to 
theistic interpretations of Hegel even God cannot attain the comprehension of Himself, which we 
attain through reading the Logic, without understanding that text Himself, and this is possible 
even for God only at the end of philosophy’s empirical history, only in and through us. Despite 
reversions and inconsistent anticipations, empirical history has progressed; otherwise the 
Hegelian method would be unusable. And, though the Logic does not fully replicate empirical 
history, the dialectical history of the rational implications of Parmenides shows his significance 
better than the empirical history of philosophy. For insofar as empirical history diverges from 
dialectical history, the Wirkungsgeschichte of an historical position is logically external to that 
position. Yet empirical history in its full religious, aesthetic, institutional, and natural context is 
more concrete than the Logic. The system begins with the Logic, an idealized version of the 
history of philosophy; it ends with the same history empirically situated in absolute spirit. Both 
logic and the philosophy of nature turn out to be branches of the philosophy of spirit—logic 
because it is an ideal reconstruction of a movement of absolute spirit and the philosophy of 
nature because it either reconstructs the history of natural science (“observation” in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit) or constructs a thought-deficient evolution of spirit slumbering in 
nature.  
8. Strength and Deficiency of Hegel’s Method. The strength of the dialectical-hermeneutic 
method is highlighted by comparison with related methods in recent social philosophy. Rawls 
and Nozick employ methods resembling Hegel’s. Both methodologically project themselves into 
an immediate, natural, or original standpoint and dialectically derive an institution’s legitimacy 
from that standpoint. Nozick justifies an ideal minimal state by projecting himself into the state 
of nature and exhibiting the self-transformation of that standpoint into citizenship.44 And Rawls 
urges justification of constitutional arrangements by detaching oneself from one’s particular 
interests to adopt the original position of a rational general will and then negotiating such 
arrangements from that position.45 Unlike Hegel, both philosophers project themselves into a 
nonhistorical, purely hypothetical standpoint. The dialectic proceeding from that standpoint thus 
can legitimate no concretely existing standpoint, which always preserves, and is constituted by, 
the transcended stages of its own emergence. A state’s present constitution is internally related to 
the process of its emergence, much as any event for Whitehead is so related to its causal past. 
Nozick’s legitimate state cannot actually exist, while Rawls’s just constitutional proposals 
remain pure Kantian “oughts” in the absence of any historical dialectic which actualizes them. 
Because Hegel alienates himself into an historical standpoint, reason exists objectively in history, 
not merely subjectively in the philosophical imagination.  
Yet Hegel’s method is subject to a limitation. It yields an interpretive understanding of the past 
as contradictory and a deductive-genetic explanation of the present as reconciliatory. Marx, by 
contrast, gives a dialectical understanding of a contradictory present in the light of future 
reconciliation; his materialistic Hegelian method aims at transformation, not mere 
understanding, of the present. Since past dialectical progress for Hegel is a given fact, he does 
not need to investigate material conditions which failed to interfere with that progress. The 
Marxist concern with the problematic future, however, requires an historical materialism which 
is methodological, not merely ontological. He cannot merely allow in general that the dialectic is 
materially conditioned, but must show actual conditions facilitating dialectical progress. The 
transcendence of a contradictory position is rationally deducible. But the premises that logically 
imply a conclusion do not logically or even causally imply that the conclusion will be drawn. 
Whether a dialectical insight is not only drawn by an isolated thinker but is also publicly 
recognized and even institutionalized, depends on the material base. This fact explains the 
inadequacy of dialectical-hermeneutic understanding of present contradictions if unaccompanied 
by rational praxis informed by knowledge of the material base and its laws of motion.  
Dialectical explanation of the present reveals the present as a resolution of past contradictions; 
dialectical understanding of the present also shows it to involve a new contradiction. Science, 
avoiding ideology, views the present as potentially both a resolution and a contradiction. Without 
an understanding of the present which is methodologically if not doctrinally Marxist, a Hegelian 
explanation of any present before the end of history is partial, ideological, and self-
congratulatory. Hegel succumbed to this risk. Insisting that philosophy’s task is to “comprehend 
what is” and that it is absurd to want to transcend one’s own time,46 Hegel congratulates Göschel 
for discovering “agreement” between Hegelianism and the existing Christian faith,47 and boasts 
to von Hardenburg that he has demonstrated “agreement” between philosophy and the principle 
of the existing Prussian state.48 Hegel is capable of recognizing existing contradictions (“…how 
poverty is to be abolished is one of the most disturbing problems which agitate modern 
society”).49 But the epic character of the idealistic dialectical-hermeneutic method assigns such 
recognition to footnotes and supplementary comments. 
Yet the materialist dialectical method cannot replace Hegel’s idealist method. The present need 
not be merely a world historical achievement, but it need not be merely a world historical 
problem either. Marx himself, who amply praised capitalism, used both methods. And Hegel 
knew the present was no mere end point,50 but equipped himself methodologically only to 
understand the present. Even if the problem of defining the Absolute is solved, the problem of 
establishing—and not merely anticipating—a rational state in which a true definition of the 
Absolute is publicly shared remains without solution. Each method helps assure the 
nonideological character of the other. A methodologically Marxist explanation of the present can 
help an Hegelian explanation of the present achieve qualified rational identification with actual 
institutions. Without both an ever deepening reconstruction of past dialectical progress and a 
search for laws of motion facilitating dialectical progress toward a rational state, Hegelianism 
lapses into either ideology or purely scholastic scholarship divorced from any viable program of 
philosophical inquiry or social action.  
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